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Gift Exchange and Workers’ Fairness Concerns: 
When Equality Is Unfair
*
 
We study how different payment modes influence the effectiveness of gift exchange as a 
contract enforcement device. In particular, we analyze how horizontal fairness concerns 
affect performance and efficiency in an environment characterized by contractual 
incompleteness. In our experiment, one principal is matched with two agents. The principal 
pays equal wages in one treatment and can set individual wages in the other. We find that 
the use of equal wages elicits substantially lower efforts. This is not caused by monetary 
incentives per se since under both wage schemes it is profit-maximizing for agents to exert 
high efforts. The treatment difference instead seems to be driven by the fact that the norm of 
equity is violated far more frequently in the equal wage treatment. After having suffered from 
violations of the equity principle, agents withdraw effort. These findings hold even after 
controlling for the role of intentions, as we show in a third treatment. Our results suggest that 
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1 Introduction
In recent years, a vast body of literature has stressed the importance of gift exchange
for mitigating moral-hazard problems of incomplete contracts: since many agents repay
a gift in the form of higher wages by providing higher eorts, eort can be elicited
under incomplete contracts even in one-shot situations where no future gains can be
expected (e.g., Akerlof 1982, Fehr et al. 1997, Maximiano et al. 2007). The potential
of gift exchange as a contract enforcement device, however, is likely to depend on the
institutions that shape the employment relation, above all the mode of payment. Yet
little is known about the interaction of dierent payment modes with gift exchange.
Exploring this interaction is crucial in order to understand under which conditions the
eciency-enhancing eects of gift exchange develop their full power. A key question
in this context is how to treat agents relative to each other as this aects the perceived
fairness of a pay scheme. In this paper, we study this question by focusing on two
important fairness principles: horizontal equality and equity.
On the one hand, it has been argued that horizontal equality is crucial for a wage
scheme to be considered as fair. Dierential pay of co-workers could cause resentment
and envy within the workforce, and ultimately lower performance (e.g., Pfeer and
Langton 1993, Bewley 1999). Wage equality is also often referred to in employer-
union bargaining as being a cornerstone of a fair wage scheme and is one of the most
prevalent payment modes (e.g., Medo and Abraham 1980, Baker et al. 1988). If
workers care foremost about equality, a wage scheme that guarantees equal wages for
co-workers should lead to an eciency-enhancing gift-exchange relation. On the other
hand, the importance of the equity principle has long been discussed in social psy-
chology, personnel management, and economics (e.g., Homans 1961, Konow 2003). In
a work environment, the equity principle (or \equity norm") demands that a person
who exerts higher eort should receive a higher wage compared to his co-worker. Only
when performance of co-workers is the same, equity and equality coincide. However, in
1Quoted in Baker et al. (1988).
1real-life work relations this is likely to be the exception rather than the rule. Whenever
workers dier in their performance, horizontal wage equality violates the equity prin-
ciple since a higher eort is not rewarded with a higher wage. In other words, if equity
is important, the often-heard slogan \equal pay for equal work" implies \unequal pay
for unequal work".2
Ideally, our research question would be examined in work environments that dif-
fer only with respect to the payment mode. To come close to this ideal world, we
introduce a simple and parsimonious laboratory experiment that allows us to analyze
the interaction between the institution of wage equality and gift exchange. In the
experiment, one principal is matched with two agents. In a rst stage the agents exert
costly eort. After observing their eorts, the principal pays them a wage. In one
treatment he can choose the level of the wage but he is obliged to pay the same wage
to both agents (equal wage treatment or EWT). In our second treatment, the principal
can wage discriminate between the two agents (individual wage treatment or IWT).
In both treatments, neither eorts nor wages are contractible. Note that principals in
the individual wage treatment are free to pay the same wage to both agents, i.e., the
EWT is a special case of the IWT. If agents care foremost about wage equality, there
should thus be no treatment dierence; if equity considerations are more important,
we should nd that the EWT elicits lower eort levels than the IWT.
The main ndings of the experiment are as follows. First, performance diers
substantially between the EWT and the IWT: agents who are paid equal wages exert
signicantly lower eorts than agents who are paid individually. Eort levels are
nearly twice as high under individual wages and eorts decline over time when equal
wages are paid. Second, this strong treatment eect cannot be explained by dierences
in monetary incentives. The actual wage choices of principals imply that providing
high eort levels is protable for agents in both treatments. From a purely monetary
viewpoint agents' behavior in both treatments should thus be similar. Third, we show
2Lazear (1989) neatly summarizes this discussion (p. 561): \It is common for both management
and worker groups such as labor unions to express a desire for homogeneous wage treatment. The
desire for similar treatment is frequently articulated as an attempt to preserve worker unity, to
maintain good morale, and to create a cooperative work environment. But it is far from obvious that
pay equality has these eects."
2that the frequent violation of the equity principle in the equal wage treatment can
explain the eort dierences between the treatments. In both treatments, agents who
exert a higher eort and earn a lower payo than their co-worker strongly decrease their
eort in the next period. However, the norm of equity is violated much more frequently
under equal wages. Principals in the IWT seem to understand the mechanisms of
equity quite well. When eorts dier they do pay dierent wages, rewarding the
harder-working agent with a higher payo in most cases. Agents' reactions cause
completely dierent dynamics in the two main treatments. Under equal wages, initially
hard-working agents appear to get discouraged and reduce their eort to the level
of their low-performing co-workers. By contrast, in the individual wage treatment
the high performers keep exerting high eorts while the low performers change their
behavior and strongly increase their eort levels.
Note that principals in the IWT can set two wages instead of one in the EWT.
This opens the possibility that agents attribute a dierent degree of intentionality to
principals' wage choices. It could be that this additional moment of discretion has
a direct impact on the treatment dierence. To rule out this potential confound, we
conduct an additional control treatment where principals can again choose only one
wage as in the EWT. The second wage is set exogenously such that the equity principle
is always fullled. Eort levels in the control treatment are similar to those of the IWT
and much higher compared to the EWT. This strongly suggests that the dierence
between our two main treatments is indeed driven by agents' desire for wages that are
in line with the equity principle.
Our results suggest a psychological rationale for using individual wages. Agents
perceive equal wages for unequal performance as unfair and reduce their eort subse-
quently. The traditional literature on incentive provision in groups comes to a similar
conclusion though for a dierent reason. It is usually argued that the ineciency of
equal wages stems from the fact that marginal products and wages are not aligned.
This can lead to free-riding among selsh agents (e.g., Holmstr om 1982, Erev et al.
1993). We enlarge the scope of this critical view on wage equality: interestingly, in
our setup it is precisely the presence of fair-minded agents and not their absence that
calls for the use of individual rewards.
3An earlier literature in social psychology also studies the consequences of equity
in social exchanges (Homans 1961, Adams 1963, Adams 1965, Andrews 1967). In his
inuential equity theory, Adams (1965) operationalizes the general equity principle
in an \equity formula", which states that the ratio of outcomes to inputs should
be the same for every individual.3 If this is not the case an individual experiences
distress and seeks to reestablish equity. Our study complements this literature in
several ways. As Mowday (1991) notes, interpreting the existing empirical evidence
can often be dicult because important aspects such as the cost of eort or the relevant
reference group are ambiguous. Our economic laboratory experiment oers a high level
of control over these aspects. In addition, violations of the equity norm arise from the
interaction of principals and agents in our study whereas they are induced by the
experimenter in most earlier experiments, e.g., by making subjects believe they are
over- or underqualied for a job (e.g., Adams 1963 or Lawler 1967).
Our results also inform the literature analyzing the inuence of relative income
on satisfaction and performance. It has been shown that relative income aects peo-
ple's well-being (e.g., Clark and Oswald 1996, Easterlin 2001, Fliebach et al. 2007).
However, it is less clear how this inuences performance, i.e., whether low relative in-
come leads to frustration and reduced performance (as in Clark et al. forthcoming and
Torgler et al. 2006) or to an increase in performance due to a \positional arms race"
(Neumark and Postlewaite 1998, Layard 2005, Bowles and Park 2005). The controlled
laboratory environment of our experiment allows us to reconcile these diering views.
Our results indicate that the comparison process goes beyond a one-dimensional com-
parison of income and also includes a comparison of eort. In particular, they suggest
that receiving a lower income while exerting a higher eort leads to reduced perfor-
mance as this conicts with the equity principle. By contrast, a lower income that is
generated by a lower eort leads to a (small) increase in performance.
There are only a few experimental studies that analyze the interaction of payment
modes and social preferences (e.g., Bandiera et al. 2005, Fehr et al. 2007, Falk et al.
2008b). Most closely related to our paper is the work of Charness and Kuhn (2007).
Here, one principal is matched with two agents who dier in their productivity; like
in our study, wages and eorts are not contractible. In contrast to our results, they
3The idea of proportionality dates at least back to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics.
4nd that co-workers' wages do not matter much for agents' decisions. However, their
design diers from ours in several important points. While Charness and Kuhn focus
on heterogeneity in productivity, we look at the eect of actual output dierences
between agents. Furthermore, we allow for richer comparisons between the agents, as
in their design agents are not aware of the magnitude and direction of the produc-
tivity dierences. The dierent results underline the importance of information for
determining the reference group: Charness and Kuhn's results rather apply to groups
of workers that are loosely related and know little about each other, while our focus
is on close co-workers who have a good understanding about their peers' abilities and
eorts.
Regarding compensation practice in rms, our ndings highlight the importance
of taking the concerns for co-workers' wages into account. However, doing so by
paying equal wages to a group of agents may actually do more harm than good.
As soon as agents dier in their performance, equal wages which seem to be a fair
institution at rst sight might be considered very unfair. While the discouraging
eect of equal wages on hard-working agents has long been informally discussed (e.g.,
Milgrom and Roberts 1992, p. 418f) this paper provides controlled evidence in favor of
this intuition. Moreover, it suggests that it is the violation of the norm of equity that
causes the discouragement and low performance. Our results should not be interpreted
as arguments against wage equality in general. They rather point to limits of equal
wages.4 Wage equality is potentially a good choice in occupations where, e.g., due to
technological reasons, workers' performance diers only slightly or where performance
dierences are due to random inuences. In addition, the transparency of co-workers'
work eorts and wages might have an inuence on the optimal choice of the pay
scheme.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section we describe
the experimental design and discuss theoretical predictions. In Section 3 we present
and discuss our results and Section 4 concludes.
4Independent of equity-equality trade-os, equal wages might be benecial for the principal be-
cause they could increase peer monitoring (Knez and Simester 2001) and lower transaction costs since
contracts do not have to be negotiated with every worker individually (e.g., Prendergast 1999).
52 Experimental Setup
2.1 Design and Procedures
In the experiment, one principal is matched with two agents. The subjects play a
two-stage game. In the rst stage, agents decide simultaneously and independently
how much eort they want to provide. Exerting eort is costly for the agents. Eort
choices range from 1 to 10 and are associated with a convex cost function displayed in
Table 1. The principal reaps the benets of production: every unit of eort increases
his payo by 10.
Eort level ei 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Cost of eort c(ei) 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 13 16 20
Table 1: Cost of eort.
In the second stage, after observing the eort decisions of his agents, the principal
decides on wages for the two agents. The wages have to be between 0 and 100. Neither
eorts nor wages are contractible. The only dierence between treatments is the mode
of payment. In one treatment the principal can only choose one wage w that is paid
to each of the agents (equal wage treatment or EWT). In the other treatment he can
discriminate between the two agents by choosing wages w1 and w2 for agent 1 and 2,
respectively (individual wage treatment or IWT). The EWT is thus a special case of the
IWT. At the end of each period, the two agents and the principal are informed about
eorts, wage(s), and the resulting payos for all three players. The payo functions
for the players are summarized in Table 2.
Treatment EWT IWT
Payo Principal P = 10(e1 + e2)   2w P = 10(e1 + e2)   (w1 + w2)
Payo Agent i Ai = w   c(ei) Ai = wi   c(ei)
Table 2: Payos of players.
This game is played for twelve periods. We implemented a stranger design to
6abstract from confounding reputation eects, i.e., at the beginning of each period
principals and agents were rematched anonymously and randomly within a matching
group. A matching group consisted of three principals and six agents. The subjects
kept their roles throughout the entire experiment. After the last period, subjects
answered a short post-experimental questionnaire. The experiment was conducted in
a labor market framing, i.e., principals were called \employers" and agents were called
\employees".5
Our setup is related to the gift-exchange game introduced by Fehr et al. (1993)
but diers in two important aspects. First, in our experiment agents move rst while
in Fehr et al.'s setup the principal moves rst. Our move order allows the principal to
base his wage decision on the actually exerted eort. More importantly, a principal
in our experiment is matched with two agents instead of one. This is an essential
prerequisite to analyze the interaction between gift exchange and payment modes. It
allows us to study the impact of relative wages on the perceived fairness of the wage
scheme and agents' behavior.
All participants started the experiment with an initial endowment of 400 points
that also served as their show-up fee. Points earned were converted at an exchange
rate of 0.01 Euro/point. The experiment was conducted at the BonnEconLab at the
University of Bonn in April 2005 using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). For each treat-
ment, we ran four sessions with a total of 8 matching groups (144 participants). The
experiment lasted approximately 70 minutes. On average subjects earned 8.30 Euro.
2.2 Behavioral Predictions
Eciency is determined by agents' eort choices. It is maximized if both agents
exert the highest possible eort of 10. However, if all players are rational and selsh
the principal will not pay anything to the agents since wage payments only reduce
his monetary payo. Anticipating this, both agents will provide the minimal eort
of one in the rst stage. The nite repetition of the game in randomly rematched
groups does not change this prediction. This subgame perfect equilibrium is the same
for both payment modes. If all players were selsh we should therefore expect no
5An English translation of the instructions is available from the authors upon request.
7dierence between treatments.
By contrast, in laboratory experiments studying labor relations with incomplete
contracts, one typically observes that eorts and wages exceed the smallest possible
value. Moreover, wages and eorts are positively correlated (e.g., Fehr and G achter
2000). These ndings illustrate the potential of reciprocal gift exchange in enforcing
incomplete contracts, as postulated in Akerlof and Yellen's fair wage-eort hypothesis
(Akerlof and Yellen 1990). A fundamental prerequisite for the functioning of gift-
exchange relations is that workers perceive their wage as fair. The fairness of a wage
payment, however, may not only be evaluated in absolute terms, but also relative to
the wages of other members in a worker's reference group.6 This is not important for
the special case of bilateral gift-exchange relationships where only one agent interacts
with one principal (e.g., Fehr et al. 1997). However, horizontal fairness considerations
potentially play a crucial role in our setup where workers can compare to co-workers.
How do the behavioral predictions depend on which horizontal fairness principle is
most important? If agents in the experiment care foremost about wage equality, the
EWT|which guarantees equal wages by design|should lead to ecient gift exchange
between rms and workers. Additionally, we should expect no behavioral dierences
between treatments since rms in the IWT can pay their workers equal wages, too.
Given that rms in the IWT recognize workers' desire for equal treatment, they will
decide to do so. Thus, the wage-eort relationship and average eort levels should
not dier across treatments. If some rms nevertheless wage discriminate between
workers, the IWT should lead to less ecient outcomes than the EWT.
By contrast, if workers consider equity to be more important than equality, we
should expect dierences in behavior between treatments. The equity principle de-
mands that a person who exerts a higher eort than his co-worker should receive a
higher wage and payo. Our experimental treatments dier in the extent to which
the equity principle can be fullled by principals. Under the equal wage institution,
the equity norm is violated whenever agents dier in their performance. Since both
6Potentially many variables inuence a worker's fairness perception of his wage, e.g., the unem-
ployment rate, unemployment benets, the prevailing market wage, etc. (see Akerlof 1982, Akerlof
and Yellen 1990). These factors are ruled out by our experimental design, allowing us to isolate the
inuence of co-workers' wages on fairness perception and eort provision.
8workers receive the same wage but have to bear the cost of eort provision, the worker
who exerts more eort receives a lower monetary payo. Under individual wages,
principals' behavior determines endogenously whether the equity norm is violated or
not. By dierentiating wages in accordance to eort dierences, principals can adhere
to the norm. If we assume that at least some principals do so, we expect to see less
norm violations in the IWT than in the EWT.
What are the behavioral consequences of such dierences in norm fulllment?
Agents who value equitable treatment should suer from norm violations, feel dis-
satised and subsequently try to restore equity by adjusting their behavior. Equity
theory proposes several possible reactions of agents after norm violations, such as al-
tering own or others' eorts or payos, changing one's reference group or quitting the
relationship (see Adams 1965). The virtue of our experimental design is that we can
clearly identify agents' reactions, because the only variable that an agent can change
after experiencing a norm violation is his work eort. An agent who faces a disad-
vantageous norm violation (i.e., relative underpayment) should lower his eort in the
following period. An agent who experiences an advantageous norm violation (i.e.,
relative overpayment) should increase his eort. Note that a norm violation always
includes one agent facing a disadvantageous violation and one agent facing an advan-
tageous violation. Dissatisfaction and the resulting strength of reactions, however, is
likely to depend on the direction of the norm violation. Previous evidence suggests
that the decrease of eort after a disadvantageous norm violation will be stronger than
the increase of eort after an advantageous violation (Loewenstein et al. 1989, Mowday
1991, Th oni and G achter 2008). Consequently, a violation of the equity norm should
lead to an overall decrease of eorts in the subsequent period.
If workers care about equitable payment in the sense of the postulated equity
norm, aggregate eort in the EWT should thus be lower compared to the IWT since
we expect to observe less norm violations in the latter.
93 Results
In this section we present the results of the experiment and discuss possible expla-
nations for the observed behavior. We rst analyze eciency implications of the two
payment schemes by comparing the eort choices of agents. We then demonstrate
that the dierence in agents' performance obtains even though monetary incentives|
implied by principals' wage setting|should lead to similar eort choices in both treat-
ments. Subsequently, we show that workers' behavior seems to be strongly aected
by the equity principle, which is more frequently violated in the EWT. Finally, we
report the results of an additional control experiment. They demonstrate that the
higher eciency of the IWT is not driven by the fact that principals can set two wages
instead of one (as in the EWT) but by the fact that principals set wages that are in
line with the equity principle.
3.1 Eort Choices and Eciency
Figure 1 shows the development of average eorts over time. Under equal wages, eorts
are lower already in the rst period (Mann-Whitney test: p = 0:03)7 and decrease
over time. Eorts under individual wages stay constant (Wilcoxon test for periods
1{6 against 7{12: IWT, p = 0:56; EWT, p < 0:01). This results in a strong overall
treatment dierence: average eorts are almost twice as high in the IWT compared
to the EWT (8.21 vs. 4.40; Mann-Whitney test: p < 0:01). The treatment dierence
is also present when individual matching groups are considered: the highest average
eort of an EWT matching group (5.88) is still lower than the lowest average eort of
an IWT matching group (7.47).
The dierence in agents' behavior can also be seen in the histogram of eort choices
(Figure 2). In the individual wage treatment agents choose the maximum eort of 10
in 49% of the cases; 84% of the choices are higher than 6. Under equal wages, agents
choose an eort higher than 6 in only 26% of all cases. The eort decisions are more
spread out in the EWT, the minimal eort of 1 being the modal choice with 24% of
7The comparison of rst period eort choices is based on individual observations. Unless otherwise






























Figure 1: Average eort per period. The eort is aggregated per period over all
matching groups.
the choices. Since higher eorts increase production and since the marginal product
of eort always exceeds its marginal cost, the dierences in eort provision directly
translate into dierences in eciency.
Result 1: The two payment modes exhibit strong dierences with respect to
the performance they elicit: agents who are paid equal wages exert signicantly
lower eorts than agents who are paid individually. This results in much higher
eciency under individual wages.
Both, the agents and the principals benet from the increase in eciency. The
average prot per period of a principal is 56 in the EWT compared to 100 in the IWT
(Mann-Whitney test: p < 0:01), while an agent on average earns 10 under equal wages
vs. 17 under individual wages (Mann-Whitney test: p < 0:01).
3.2 Wage Setting and Monetary Incentives
The strong dierence in eort choices suggests that the degree to which gift exchange
can mitigate contract enforcement problems depends on the payment mode that is
used. Wage equality hampers eciency, and we hypothesized above that this might































Figure 2: Frequency of eort choices.
be driven by diering monetary incentives across treatments. To rule this out, we take
a closer look at principals' wage setting and the resulting monetary incentives for the
agents.
Figure 3 plots the average wage per eort level in the two treatments. For both
treatments we take the wage paid by the principal for each individual eort decision
and calculate averages for a given eort level. The graph exhibits the upward sloping
eort-wage relation of many gift-exchange experiments. For example, an agent in the
equal wage treatment who exerts an eort of 1 receives on average a wage of 6:3 while
an agent exerting an eort of 10 receives an average wage of 30:3. In the individual
wage treatment, the corresponding wages are 1:7 and 39:5.8 The eort-wage relation
indicates that gift exchange indeed occurs between principals and agents. In both
treatments, higher eort levels are reciprocated with higher wages.
8Since principals in the EWT have to pay the same wage to both agents, an interesting question
concerns how they choose this wage when confronted with a low and a high eort. To answer this
question, we assume that the wage-eort relation from the IWT reects the \true" wage-setting
preferences of principals because wage choices are not constrained in this treatment. We regress
wages on eort in the IWT and calculate predicted wages for all possible levels of eort. We then
calculate the dierences between actual wages paid in the EWT and these predicted wages. This
analysis shows that the actual wage in the EWT is very close to the average between the predicted
wage for the higher and lower eort. This means that principals in the EWT weight the higher and



























Figure 3: Average wage for a given eort.
Result 2: Principals reward higher eort levels with higher wages in both
treatments.
Reciprocal behavior of principals generates monetary incentives for the agents. In
order to calculate the monetary incentives entailed in principals' wage decisions, one
has to take into account agents' cost of eort exertion (see Table 1). Qualitatively,
this does not change the picture of the eort-wage relation: higher eort levels seem
to lead not only to higher wages, but also to higher prots for the agents. To check
this in more detail, we estimate an OLS-model where we regress the agent's prot per
period Ai on his eort level ei and a constant. To account for potential dierences
between treatments we include a treatment dummy IWT, and an interaction term
of the treatment dummy and the agent's eort. IWT equals 1 for the individual
wage treatment and 0 for the equal wage treatment. Reported robust standard errors
are adjusted for clustering within matching groups. Estimation results are shown in
Column 1 of Table 3. The coecients indicate that the eort-prot relation is indeed
positive in both treatments. On average, an additional unit of eort increases the
agent's prot under equal wages by 1.031 points. This coecient is weakly signicant.
In the individual wage treatment the eort-prot relation is slightly steeper: an eort
increase of 1 leads to an increase in agent's prot of 1.804 points (1.031 + 0.773). The
dierence between treatments, however, is not signicant.
We also estimate a second model where we control for the co-worker's eort ej (see
13Dep. Variable Ai Ai
ei 1.031* 0.854**
(0.535) (0.348)








IWT  ej -3.178***
(0.403)
N. Obs. 576 576
R2 0.100 0.238
Table 3: Prot regressions. Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustered matching
groups and are given in parentheses. For each rm, one observation per period is
included in the analysis. The dummy \IWT" is equal to 1 for the individual wage
treatment. Signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level is denoted by *, **, and ***,
respectively.
Column 2 of Table 3). The results indicate that the co-worker's eort choice has a
substantial impact on an agent's prot under wage equality while it has a negligible
inuence if individual wages are paid. An increase in agent j's eort increases agent i's
prot in a given period by 2.774 points in the EWT, while the (insignicant) inuence
in the IWT is  0:404 (= 2:774   3:178). However, it is still individually protable
for the agents to exert high eorts in the EWT. An additional unit of (own) eort
increases the agent's prot by 0.854 points.9 Our ndings concerning agents' monetary
9One could object that subjects in the experiment did not have access to the analyses we just pre-
sented, because these are \ex-post" examinations while subjects only observed behavior and outcomes
of their previous groups. We therefore calculate the prot-maximizing eort level for each agent in
each period based on the information this subject actually has. If we assume that agents choose the
eort level that was on average the most protable of all eort levels they have observed so far, the
calculations show that agents in the EWT could have increased their eorts and prots considerably
14incentives can thus be summarized as follows.
Result 3: The wages paid by principals imply similar monetary incentives in
both treatments. A higher eort level leads to a higher prot in both treatments.
3.3 The Importance of Equity
In light of the previous result, the strong dierences in actual eorts and especially
the low eort levels under equal wages are remarkable and stress the signicance
of non-pecuniary motivations for agents' performance. Agents under equal wages
predominantly choose low eorts, thereby foregoing considerable prots. Apparently,
equal wages are not reconcilable with agents' horizontal fairness considerations. On
the other hand, agents under individual wages provide very high eort levels. Thus,
aggregate behavior is consistent with the predictions of equity-concerned agents. We
therefore focus our analysis of non-monetary motivations on the question whether
individual behavior is also in line with a concern for the fulllment of the norm of
equity.
3.3.1 Agents' Reactions to Norm Violations
We rst analyze how agents react to a violation of the norm of equity. Equity theory
argues that agents experience distress from inequity and take action to reduce it|
which in our setup means to increase or decrease work eort. The direction of the
eort adjustment should depend on the type of norm violation. An equity-concerned
agent who works more but does not receive a higher payo than his co-worker faces
a disadvantageous norm violation. To restore equity, he can only decrease his eort.
Analogously, his co-worker who exerts a lower eort and earns a higher prot faces an
advantageous norm violation and should increase his eort.10
even by using only their limited information. In the last period, the average prot-maximizing eort
level exceeds the average actual level in that period by 61%. By contrast, the average actual eort
levels of subjects in the IWT are very close to the prot-maximizing levels.
10More precisely, an advantageous norm violation comprises all cases when eorts are equal but
prot is higher, or when eort is lower but prot is not. A disadvantageous norm violation occurs if
eorts are equal but prot is lower, or if eort is higher but prot is not.
15Eort Down Eort Constant Eort Up N. Obs.
EWT
No Violation 19.1 % 54.4 % 26.5 % 68
Adv. Violation 12.2 % 43.5 % 44.3 % 230
Disadv. Violation 52.6 % 33.9 % 13.5 % 230
Total 30.7 % 40.7 % 28.6 % 528
IWT
No Violation 19.2 % 51.8 % 29.0 % 448
Adv. Violation 45.0 % 27.5 % 27.5 % 40
Disadv. Violation 35.0 % 57.5 % 7.5 % 40
Total 22.3 % 50.4 % 27.3 % 528
Table 4: Frequency of eort reactions.
Table 4 shows how often agents decrease, increase or do not change their eort
from period t to t+1 after they experienced no, an advantageous or a disadvantageous
norm violation in period t. The top panel of Table 4 reports data for the equal wage
treatment. When the norm is fullled, most agents keep their eort constant (54%)
and slightly more agents increase their eort than decrease it. After experiencing an
advantageous norm violation, agents tend to increase their eort (44%) and only few
reduce it (12%). The opposite is true after a disadvantageous norm violation: the
majority of agents decrease their eort (53%) and only few increase their eort in the
following period (14%). In line with equity theory these numbers suggest that agents
change their eort provision in the direction that makes a violation less likely to occur
in the next period.
Behavior in the individual wage treatment (bottom panel) is very similar to behav-
ior in the EWT for the cases of no violation and disadvantageous violations. When the
norm is not violated agents mostly keep their eort unchanged. After a disadvanta-
geous norm violation eorts are decreased rather than increased, as in the EWT. The
only dierence between treatments is observed when agents experience an advanta-
geous norm violation: agents in the IWT tend to decrease their eort while the EWT
agents tend to increase it in this case.11
11We checked the robustness of the reaction patterns in several ways. For example, it could be that
16The pattern of individual reactions to norm violations indicates that agents care
about equity; we therefore check next how often norm violations occur in the two
treatments. We expected to see more norm violations in the EWT than in the IWT,
because the equal wage institution forces principals to set wages that are not in line
with the norm of equity whenever agents exert dierent eorts. This is indeed what
we observe. While the norm is violated in 87% of all cases (460 out of 528) in the
EWT, the gure for the IWT is only 15% of all cases (80 out of 528). Thus, even if
individual reactions in a given situation are similar, agents in the EWT are far more
often exposed to norm violations than agents in the IWT. Principals in the IWT seem
to understand quite well that agents care about equity and use the possibility to set
dierent wages in a sophisticated way. If eorts dier, they reward the more hard-
working agent with a higher wage in 90% of these cases. If agents exert the same
eort, principals pay equal wages in 90% of the cases.
Result 4: Agents mostly react to disadvantageous violations of the norm of
equity by reducing their eort and by increasing it after an advantageous norm
violation. The norm of equity is far more often violated in the equal wage
treatment.
So far we have seen that agents' reactions are largely in line with the hypotheses of
equity theory and that treatments dier with respect to the frequency of equity-norm
violations. Yet, this is not sucient to explain the treatment eect, since a norm
violation is always advantageous for one agent and at the same time disadvantageous
for the other one. If both agents adjust their eort in a similar way but in opposite
directions the adjustments will cancel out. However, previous evidence suggests that
reactions to a disadvantageous norm violation are stronger than reactions to an advan-
tageous one (e.g., Loewenstein et al. 1989, Mowday 1991, Th oni and G achter 2008).
If this is the case, norm violations could explain the downward trend in the EWT and
agents react dierently to norm violations if they are paid very high or low absolute wages. However,
performing the analysis only for agents receiving a wage out of the top or bottom quartile of the
ex-post wage distribution does not alter the result. An implicit assumption of our analysis is that
the gift-exchange relation is generally intact between principal and agent, i.e., that agents exert a
non-minimal eort and that principals pay a positive wage. The results do not change if one restricts
the analysis to these cases. Also if one denes gift exchange as requiring the agent's prot to be
positive, i.e. wi > c(ei) instead of wi > 0, the results are very similar.
17the treatment dierence in eort provision.
Figure 4 shows the average magnitude of changes in eort provision from period
t to period t + 1 after an agent experienced no norm violation, a disadvantageous or
an advantageous norm violation in period t. The width of the bars corresponds to
the number of observations in the respective category (cf. last column of Table 4).
When the equity-norm is not violated agents tend to keep their eort constant or
even slightly increase it. After a disadvantageous norm violation, agents in the EWT
react strongly. They decrease their eort by 1:30. Their co-worker, experiencing an
advantageous norm violation, increases his eort but not as strongly. He raises his
eort by only 0:75. The dierence is statistically signicant (Wilcoxon test of the
absolute values: p = 0:01). In the IWT, both groups of agents experiencing a norm
violation decrease their eort. The strength of reactions indicate that agents suer
more from a disadvantageous norm violation than from an advantageous one. This
results in an overall decrease of eorts after a norm violation.
Result 5: Agents' reactions to a violation of the norm of equity are asym-
metric: the negative reaction of the disadvantaged agents is stronger than the
reaction of the advantaged agents. This asymmetry in agents' reactions leads
to an overall negative time trend in eorts for the EWT and in the strong
treatment dierence in eort.
The analysis above suggests that agents care about equity and experience the equal
wage scheme as unfair. Interestingly, even the principals consider the equal wage
scheme as less fair. In the post-experimental questionnaire, principals were presented
three hypothetical game situations that included eort choices, wage choices, and the
resulting payos for all players. They were asked whether they considered the resulting
allocation as just. One of the three situations reected their own average behavior in
the experiment.12 The principals did not know that they were facing their own past
decisions when answering the question. 63% of the principals in the IWT considered
their own decisions fair while only 38% of the principals in the EWT shared this view
12This situation was constructed as follows: We calculated the average eort of the higher-eort and
of the lower-eort providers that the principals actually faced during the experiment. We then took
the average of the wages the principals paid to the two groups. Finally, we calculated hypothetical



































Figure 4: Magnitude of eort reactions. The average change in eort from period
t to period t + 1 is shown given that the agent experienced no norm violation, an
advantageous violation or a disadvantageous norm violation in period t. The width of
the bars corresponds to the number of observations.
(Mann-Whitney test on matching group shares: p = 0:03).
3.3.2 Simulation with Equity-Concerned Agents
We demonstrated above that horizontal fairness concerns shape agents' behavior under
the two payment schemes. In combination with the frequent violations of the norm of
equity in the EWT, this can explain the performance dierences across treatments. In
order to further illustrate how institutions and equity-concerns interact, we take our
previous ndings on agents' period-to-period reactions and link them to the aggregate
dynamics in the experiment. We do so with a simulation in which all agents are
assumed to derive utility from money, but to also suer whenever the equity principle
is not met. When deciding about their eort in a given period, the simulated agents
compare their eort and prot in the previous period with the eort and prot of their
co-worker in that period. According to the comparison along these two dimensions,
four reactions can be distinguished for the simulated agents. (i) For an agent who had
a higher eort and a higher prot, the norm of equity is fullled and the pecuniary
comparison is also advantageous for him, so he keeps his eort constant. (ii) For an
agent who exerted a lower eort and got a lower prot, the norm is satised but prot
maximization is not, thus he partly adjusts his eort in the direction of his co-worker's
19eort, i.e., he chooses an eort (ei;t+ej;t)=2. (iii) An agent with higher eort and lower
prot feels distressed as he suers from a disadvantageous norm violation. He adjusts
his eort fully and chooses ei;t+1 = ej;t. (iv) Finally, for an agent with lower eort and
higher prot the norm violation is advantageous, thus the resulting utility is higher
than in case (iii). He chooses an eort (ei;t + ej;t)=2. The reactions in cases (i) to (iv)
are in line with the period-to-period reactions presented in Table 4 and Figure 4.
In the simulation, we use actual eort data from the experiment only for the
rst period. The subsequent eort decisions are based on the simulated prots and
simulated eorts of the previous period. The simulated principals pay the average
wage for a given eort (IWT) or the average wage sum for a given eort sum (EWT)
as calculated from the experimental data. Prots are then calculated as wage minus
cost of eort exertion. We use the same matching protocol as in the experiment.
Figure 5 shows how eort choices evolve over time in the experimental data and
in the simulations. The simulations `EWT sim' and `IWT sim' trace the real data
very well and are able to reproduce the large eort dierence between treatments. In
the individual wage simulation, eorts increase like the real eorts although the slight
downward trend in the second half of the experiment cannot be reproduced. Eorts
in the equal wage simulation constantly decrease down to an eort level slightly above































Figure 5: Simulated eorts of agents adopting to equity-norm violations.
20Note that the pivotal agent is dierent between the simulated treatments: in the
equal wage simulation the norm of equity is violated when agents choose dierent
eort levels. In these cases, the agent with the higher eort will fully adjust his eort
in the direction of his co-worker's eort while the co-worker will increase his eort
level only to the average eort of the last period. In the EWT simulation, the average
eort therefore converges to the lowest rst period eort as agents are subsequently
re-matched: the low-eort providers are pivotal. By contrast, in the IWT the high-
eort providers have the decisive impact on the overall outcome. The norm of equity
is mostly fullled in the IWT. Thus, the agent with the higher eort keeps his eort
constant while his co-worker adjusts his eort. The average eort therefore converges
to the highest rst period eort. We will analyze this point in more detail in the next
section.
Result 6: Simulations based on agents who have preferences for money and
equitable treatment are in line with the eorts observed in the experiment and
are able to reproduce the observed treatment eect.
3.4 Dynamics of High- and Low-Eort Providers
As already seen in Figure 2, subjects exhibit a substantial degree of heterogeneity with
respect to eort provision. In the following, we analyze if the agents who are most or
least willing to exert eort are aected dierently by the two payment modes at hand.
A common informal argument claims that equal wages will be especially detrimental to
the motivation of high performers but clean empirical evidence is scarce. Furthermore,
it is unclear how weakly motivated agents react to equal or individual wages. We
also address the question whether high and low performers impact the overall results
dierently in the two treatments. The simulations presented in the previous section
suggest that this could indeed be the case: in the EWT simulation, the low-eort
providers are decisive for the nal outcome while it is the high-eort providers in the
IWT simulation.
To analyze these questions in the experimental data we classify agents according to
their eort decision in the rst period. We dene the agent with the highest rst-period
eort in each matching group as \high-eort provider" and the agent with the lowest
21eort as \low-eort provider". This type denition is chosen because when agents
decide on their eort in the rst period, they do not have any information about the
behavior of other subjects and all learning and coordination processes occur after this
initial eort choice. Thus rst-period eort is likely to be a good proxy for the intrinsic
willingness of a specic agent to exert eort. If some of the subjects are intrinsically
inclined to exert high eorts they should show up in the group of high-eort providers.
In contrast, if some of the subjects are intrinsically inclined to exert low eorts they
should show up in the group of low-eort providers.
In Figure 6 we follow the high-eort providers and low-eort providers in both
treatments and show their eort decisions over time. In the rst period, the groups of
high-eort providers and the groups of low-eort providers are close together across
treatments.13 This changes completely over the course of the 12 periods. In the
individual wage treatment, high-eort providers continue to provide high eort levels.
Low-eort providers increase their eorts dramatically up to the level of the high-
eort providers and even higher in the last periods. In the equal wage treatment,
the dynamics are reversed. Here, the low-eort providers keep their eort provision
constant and the high-eort providers reduce their eorts to the level of the low-eort
providers. In the last six periods, eort levels are not dierent within treatments
(Wilcoxon signed rank test: p = 0:67 (IWT), p = 0:78 (EWT)) while they dier
between treatments (Mann-Whitney test: p < 0:01 (high-eort providers), p < 0:01
(low-eort providers)). Put dierently, the \good" agents push the \bad" agents up
under individual wages while under equal wages the \bad" ones pull the \good" ones
down.
These dynamics underline the importance of the dierent non-monetary motives
induced by the two wage setting institutions. Remember that agents face similar
monetary incentives in both treatments, but wage equality often violates the norm of
equity. Agents in this treatment who are in principle willing to exert high levels of
13First period's eort levels are not signicantly dierent between treatments for high-eort
providers (Mann-Whitney test: p = 0:14) while they are close together but dierent for the low-
eort providers (Mann-Whitney test: p = 0:03). Within treatments, the high-eort and low-eort
providers choose statistically dierent eort levels in the rst period (Wilcoxon signed rank test:































Figure 6: Eort decisions of high-eort and low-eort providers. In each matching
group, the agent with the highest (lowest) eort in the rst period is dened as the high
(low)-eort provider.
eort seem to get frustrated and lower their eorts. On the contrary, under individual
wages where the norm of equity is intact, good performance spreads. These results
suggest that choosing a wage scheme also inuences the social dynamics between the
agents. In our experiment, individual wages lead to positive dynamics since agents
orientate themselves by the most hard-working agents. In contrast, the equal wage
scheme focuses agents' attention on the least motivated agents.
Result 7: The pivotal agent is dierent between treatments: in the IWT,
agents who initially provide low eort align with the high-eort providers over
time. In the EWT, agents who initially provide high eort align with the low-
eort providers over time.
3.5 The Role of Intentions
So far, we interpret our results as supporting the notion that subjects care about the
norm of equity. However, by design our treatments necessarily dier in the number
of instruments that a principal has at hand. In the EWT, principals only choose a
single wage|whereas principals in the IWT decide on two wages and consequently
can tailor reactions individually to agents' preceding choices. Therefore, agents might
attribute a dierent degree of intentionality to principals' decisions: in the EWT, the
23role of intentions is limited to the level of the wage. The IWT contains an additional
element of intentionality because principals also decide on relative wages and conse-
quently whether the equity norm is fullled or violated. In light of the literature that
stresses the behavioral importance of intentions in situations of reciprocal interaction
(e.g., Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004, Falk et al. 2008a), there is thus a potential
alternative explanation for our treatment eect. In other words, one might speculate
that the dierence is not caused by the dierent frequency of norm fulllment per se,
but rather by the additional element of intentionality.14
To test this alternative explanation, we conducted an additional control treatment
(wage level treatment or WLT) that clearly isolates the eect of norm fulllment on
agents' eort choices. As in the EWT, principals in the WLT only choose a single
wage. The other agent's wage is then exogenously set by a computer program such
that the equity norm is always fullled, i.e., agents who exerted a higher eort than
their co-worker automatically receive a higher payo. This is common knowledge.
Importantly, this implies that the fulllment of the equity norm is not attributable
to principals' decisions. Except for this change of the wage-setting institution, the
instructions and the experimental design were identical to the previous treatments.
The 72 subjects who participated in the four additional sessions had not previously
taken part in the IWT or the EWT.
The specic equity norm implemented in the WLT experiments dictates proportion-
ality between agents' monetary payos and eorts. We chose this \equity formula" as
it is probably the most prominent formulation of the equity principle (see Section 2.2).
Given a principal's decision for the low-eort agent, the wage for the high-performing
agent is exogenously xed such that both agents receive the same payo per unit of
eort provided, i.e., (low=elow) = (high=ehigh) holds. For example, if the principal
observes eorts of 2 and 6 and sets the wage for the low-eort provider to be 5, the
payo of this agent is 5   c(2) = 4 (compare Table 1). Following the equity formula,
the payo of the high-eort provider will then automatically be set to (4=2)  6 = 12;
which implies a wage of 20 after taking the cost of providing 6 units of eort into
account.15
14We thank the Editor, Patrick Bolton, and an anonymous referee for pointing this out.






























Figure 7: Average eort per treatment.
The wage-setting institution in the WLT is not meant to be an analog of institu-
tions found in actual labor markets, as it is the case for the IWT and the EWT. It
exogenously implements the incentive structure that is endogenously created by prin-
cipals in the IWT.16 If we observe similar eorts in the WLT as in the IWT we can rule
out intentions as an explanation for the dierence between our two main treatments,
IWT and EWT.
Figure 7 compares agents' mean eort choices over time for all three treatments.
As can be seen, the exogenous implementation of the equity norm suces to elicit
or outcomes are possible. Therefore, if in our experiment the eorts dier and the principal's choice
of wlow implies low  0, the other agent's wage is instead set such that high = low + 5. This
guarantees that the norm of equity is fullled for all possible wage-eort combinations. Nevertheless,
the high-eort agent still faces the risk of making losses whenever the low-eort agent gets a negative
payo.
16As shown in Result 3, the monetary incentives in the IWT imply that prot-maximizing agents
should provide non-minimal eort levels. As a consequence of exogenously implementing these im-
plicit incentives in the WLT, new subgame-perfect Nash equilibria necessarily arise. Our focus of
interest, however, rests on the comparison of the observed behavior across treatments rather than
on comparing behavior to the game-theoretical equilibrium predictions. For a similar approach of
\exogenizing" endogenous incentives to test for the impact of intentions, compare for example Blount
(1995), Charness (2004), or Cox (2004).
25high eorts from the agents. The average eort dierence between the WLT and the
IWT of only 0.36 is insignicant (Mann-Whitney test: p = 0:83). Compared to the
EWT, eorts are on average 3.44 units higher in the wage-level treatment (Mann-
Whitney test: p < 0:01). As in the IWT, eorts do not decrease over time in the WLT
(Wilcoxon test for periods 1{6 against 7{12: p = 0:44). Also the distribution of eorts
in the WLT closely resembles the one in the IWT. Under both treatments, the modal
choice is the provision of maximum eort. In the WLT, an eort level of 10 is chosen
in 46.5% of all cases, compared to 49% in the IWT.
Result 8: The wage level treatment shows that the treatment dierence be-
tween the IWT and the EWT is not caused by the fact that principals can
set two wages instead of one per se. Dierences in equity norm fulllment|
independent of intentionality|seem to be the driving force behind agents' per-
formance.
Taken together, the results from the additional control treatment corroborate our
previous ndings. They suggest that the observed performance dierences are not
driven by the diering degree of intentionality across treatments. This, of course, does
not imply that intentions are unimportant in general; however in our setup, treatment
dierences are almost exclusively driven by equity considerations.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we studied the interaction of gift exchange with dierent payment modes;
more specically, we analyzed how horizontal fairness concerns of employees aect the
eectiveness of gift exchange as a contract enforcement device. In our experiment, one
principal is matched with two agents. The principal pays equal wages in one treatment
and can set individual wages in the other. The use of equal wages elicits substantially
lower eorts and eciency in spite of similar monetary incentives: exerting high eort
pays o under both wage schemes. The strong treatment dierence seems to be driven
by subjects' preferences for horizontal equity and the fact that the equity principle is
frequently violated in the equal wage treatment. This is not the case in the individual
wage treatment, as principals set wages almost always in line with the norm of equity.
26The results of a control treatment support the notion that indeed norm fulllment
per se and not dierent degrees of intentionality are the driving force behind agents'
behavior.
Our results have a number of implications, both for the advancement of existing
theories and for the design of wage schemes in practice. First of all, while it is well-
known that equal wages can distort monetary incentives, in our experiment they are
eciency decreasing even though individuals' monetary incentives are qualitatively not
aected. Rather, equal wages oftentimes lead to situations which are considered as
unfair by the workforce. This holds in particular because agents are heterogeneous and
equal wages violate the equity principle whenever workers dier in their performance.
It may thus be oversimplifying to argue that equal wages lead to less envy and therefore
higher work morale, as it is frequently done in the political discussion.
In this regard, it is doubtful whether strict wage equality can be reconciled with the
use of reciprocal gift exchange to enforce incomplete contracts. Our ndings suggest
that adherence to the norm of equity is a necessary prerequisite for a successful gift-
exchange relation. Consequently, the wage setting institution must provide principals
with means to account for possible dierences in agents' behavior, e.g., to individually
reward agents who outperform their co-workers. The performance of agents in the
individual wage treatment and in the wage level treatment shows how eective gift
exchange can be, as long as horizontal equity concerns are respected: although explicit
contract enforcement is absent, 80% of the possible eciency gains are realized.
In practice, the discretion to fulll the norm of equity does not have to be in mon-
etary terms. Perks and non-monetary benets like extra vacation or awards can be
useful devices to motivate workers in this context. These instruments become espe-
cially important when it is not possible to wage discriminate on a given hierarchical
level, e.g., because the rm's internal pay structure, agreements with a union or legis-
lation dictate wage equality.
The results in this paper should not be interpreted as arguments against wage
equality in general. They rather suggest that equal wages come at a cost that has
to be weighed against their potential benets. For example, equal wages are easier
to implement than individual wages, and they may encourage peer monitoring and
27collaboration. The relative importance of these costs and benets (and also the impact
of the workforce's social preferences more generally) is likely to depend on the details
of the institutional setting. These include the production technology, the information
structure, and the organizational design of the rm. In this paper we presented results
for one such setting. Our design provides a simple and parsimonious framework that
can successively be enriched to study these aspects in future research.
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